Who opposes Scottish independence?

Voter opposition to Scottish independence

Stephen Richard — Sat, 23 Oct 2021 06:12:08 +0000

Voter opposition to Scottish independence Stephen Richard Sat, 10/23/2021 - 07:12

Author or Creator

Common Weal

Country of Birth is a substantial driver of support for independence. Support for independence is particularly volatile amongst males aged 34-55 but remains relatively stable for other age groups. Support for independence amongst females is generally rising in all age groups.

Remain voters are far more likely to say they will vote for independence and Leave voters now far more likely to vote against.

Social grades ABC1 were overwhelmingly likely to vote No. Social grades C2DE are extremely likely to vote for independence.

Labour and Liberal Democrat voters are volatile with their support for independence. Conservative voters are overwhelmingly against independence but around 5% of Conservative voters are consistently pro-independence.

More details

― Between 2014 and 2018, overall support for independence continuously fell from around 45% to a low of 40%. It subsequently rose continuously to a high just above 50% in early 2021 before dropping back to 45% by June 2021.

― Country of Birth is a substantial driver of support for independence though data is extremely limited in this respect. Support for independence amongst people born in Scotland has fallen below the level of support seen in 2014. Support for independence has risen substantially above 2014 levels among people born outwith Scotland.

― The impact of voters not born in Scotland on support for independence has reduced very substantially since 2014 with the gap between Yes and No in this group narrowing. There is clear evidence that many New Scots can and have been convinced to support independence in the time since 2014.

― Support for independence is particularly volatile amongst males aged 34-55 but remains relatively stable for other age groups.

― Support for independence amongst females is generally rising in all age groups but a substantial ‘generation gap’ is widening and 2021 has seen a dramatic fall in support for independence amongst young females.

― People who voted Yes in 2014 have remained very stable in their support at least since the 2016 Brexit referendum. 2014 No voters are much more changeable and make up the majority of the population of people who have changed their minds one or more times since 2014.

― In 2016 attitudes towards independence and attitudes towards Brexit were not strongly linked but have since become much more correlated. Remain voters are far more likely to say they will vote for independence and Leave voters now far more likely to vote against.

― Social grades ABC1 were overwhelmingly likely to vote No in 2014 but the vast majority of the overall gains in support between 2018 and 2020 came from this group. However, so did the majority of the loss of support in 2021 indicating that this population is swayable, but fickle in its support.

― Social grades C2DE are extremely likely to vote for independence. Their support for independence has also been much more stable as a whole than their ABC1 counterparts. However, this group is substantially less likely to turn out and vote.

― SNP voters are the most likely to support independence though around one in five voters are not. The Brexit referendum saw large drop in support for independence amongst SNP voters followed by a rapid recovery – one interpretation of this is that ‘Leave’ voters have switched to voting for a party other than the pro-EU SNP.

― Labour and Liberal Democrat voters are volatile with their support for independence and are so in a way that doesn’t easily correlate with events affecting the overall polls.

― Conservative voters are overwhelmingly against independence but around 5% of Conservative voters are consistently pro-independence. Extrapolating from the recent elections in Scotland, this indicates that there are more pro-independence Conservative voters in Scotland than there are paid members of the party (the same is also true for Labour and the Lib Dems).

The lack of detailed studies of public attitudes towards independence and/or the Union since 2014 which are publicly available has severely hampered the campaign for Scottish independence and may have led some campaigners to severely misunderstand or simply miss trends and shifting opinions which have significantly changed the electoral map of Scotland in the time since the last independence referendum. It is now urgent that more and better data are gathered not just on headline numbers but within demographics and in a way that can compliment the now considerable level of longitudinal information on shifting trends in opinion on independence.

What scant data we have, gleaned from subsamples of a relatively limited number of polls, are showing that Scotland is not changing its opinion of independence in a ‘uniform swing’ where the whole population moves its support up or down all at once in a manner that one might infer from only looking at headline numbers. Older males are becoming steadily less inclined towards independence at the same time as older females are becoming more inclined. Younger females have experienced a recent and sudden relative aversion towards independence that is not replicated at all by their male peers. The electorate have increasingly aligned their attitudes towards the EU along with their attitudes towards independence in a way that may make it difficult to separate the two. The voters of pro-Union parties are significantly less pro-Union than the parties they vote for. And the attitudes towards independence amongst native Scots is declining whilst ‘New Scots’ are shifting ever more in favour of creating a new country in a land not of their birth.

All of these factors create a problem and an opportunity for the independence movement. The problem is that we need to realign our campaign and messaging based not on our own personal experiences, bias or even prejudices but to base it on the wants and needs of the people we speak to as we campaign. The opportunity, however, is to craft a campaign that is effective, can harness the votes of people who have shown themselves capable of considering independence at some point over the past several years and ultimately create the conditions for an independent Scotland built on a foundation of support that will ensure the best possible start to a new country

Keywords

Scottish Independence

Opposition to Scottish independence

Opinion polls

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